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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

22 May 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allen Dulles

Brigadier General John Magruder Rear Admiral Leslie C. Stevens

Mr. Edward W. Barrett

SUBJECT:

List of Suggested Agenda Items and Projects

for PSB

- 1. It is recommended that the PSB at its first meeting:
- a. take note of the functions and proposed organization of the Staff (TABs A and B of memorandum of 21 May);
 - b. discuss the relationship of PSB to the NSC;
 - c. consider substantive problems.
- 2. The substantive problems for consideration should be those selected by the deputies for priority attention. They would be placed on the agenda only at such time as necessary staff work has been completed.
- 3. The deputies may find the attached list useful in selecting the most important problems for early consideration.

JAMES Q. REBER Acting Assistant Director Intelligence Coordination SECRET
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| 4 | Suggestions for Priority Attention | |
|--|--|------------|
| | 1. The defection of Communist China from the USSR | ILLEGIB |
| | 2. Psychological strategy to be followed on the death of Stalin | |
| | 3. A psychological warfare plan for | K 1 |
| | 4. Psychological policies with respect to the Atomic Bomb | |
| | 5. Subversion, demoralization and defection of Soviet troops in | |
| | East Germany | |
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| (B. | Additional Items | |
| The state of the s | 6. A psychological plan for | 25X1 |
| · | 7. National policy measures designed to increase desired | |
| | defections (both in and outside combat areas) | |
| | 8. Psychological strategy with regard to the universal desire | |
| | for Peace: | |
| | a. desirability of a disarmament proposal | |
| | b. countering Soviet 1951 Peace Campaign | |
| | 9. Implementation of | 25X1 |
| 11. | Long-Term Projects (see TAB A) | |
| 1 | 10. Psychological strategy in the Cold War | |
| 1 | 11. Campaign to improve the personnel situation in psychological | |
| 7 | operations | |
| 3 | 12. Survey of policy planning and research in the field of psycho- | |
|) | logical operations | |
| | 13. Survey of activities evaluating the effectiveness of psycho- | |
| 4 | logical operations | |
| | TOKTOOT OBSTOATORS | |

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| D. Administrative | |
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| 14. Pover and deception in current national psychological warfare | |
| toward USSR | 25X1 |
| | |
| 15. National psychological warfare and special operations personnel | |
| control and allocation | |
| 16. Measures to refine operational psychological warfare techniques | |
| E. Informational. | |
| 17. | 25X1 |
| | |
| 18. Interdepartmental coordination and execution of current | |
| Russian plan | |

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I. Psychological Strategy in the cold war

Many individuals working in the field of psychological operations in the cold war have felt the absence of a "grand-strategy" -- a set of objectives toward the attainment of which all efforts can be directed. One cannot be so sanguine as to hope that such a strategy can be clearly outlined by any one agency or in a short period of time. Furthermore, it is a matter which clearly goes far beyond the competence of psychological operations specialists. These difficulties, however, do not excuse psychological operations planners from making what contribution they can toward the grand strategy, and the establishment of a Psychological Strategy Board gives them a better opportunity of doing so than they have had heretofore. It is believed, therefore, that one of the first tasks of the new board should be to set in motion a major effort to formulate a broad, worldwide psychological strategy for the cold war.

A suggested procedure for accomplishing this is as follows:

Appointment of a working group composed of the nation's very best brains in the field of psychological operations and making provision to see that they have facilities for concentrated work.

Some such membership as the following is suggested. Since it is not possible to be sure that the individuals named will be able to serve, this list represents more the type of composition recommended, rather than the actual composition.

25X1

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- 2. A working place outside Washington should be designated for meetings. It has been noted in previous similar cases that it is much simpler to enable top quality men to work on problems of this sort personally (rather than delegating them to subordinates) if they can be insulated from the pressure of routine duties.

 This insulation procedure is commonly adopted by such agencies as Brookings and RAND with a considerable measure of success.
- 3. The group should be asked to work on such very broad problems as the following:
 - a. What psychological and other measures can be taken to restrain Soviet aggression?
 - b. What psychological and other measures can be taken to strengthen our allies and potential allies?
 - c. How may the best statement of U. S. ideology be arrived at?
 - d. How can our cold war aims be defined?
- 4. The temporary staff of the PSB should be asked to take the following measures in preparation for this working group:
 - a. Make necessary arrangements for meeting place, secretarial help, security, etc.
 - b. Prepare briefing papers. (For example, an analysis of NSC papers and Presidential statements having a bearing on psychological operations.)
 - c. Arrange for oral briefings by governmental experts, as needed.

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- 5. The full group should be asked to meet for a three or four day period at the beginning of the summer and for a three or four day period toward the end of the summer. In between the two full meetings sub-groups should be asked to work on specific phases of the overall problem.
- 6. It should be emphasized that this is not to be viewed as an effort to work out a national policy binding on all agencies.

 It is rather an attempt to answer two questions:
 - a. From the point of view of psychological operations, what should our national policy be?
 - b. How may existing national policy be exploited more effectively through psychological operations?
- II. A Long-term Campaign to Improve the Personnel Situation in Psychological Operations

This campaign might be divided into two parts: (1) an effort to improve and coordinate training programs, and (2) an effort to induce superior personnel who already have the available qualifications to enter government service in the field of psychological operations. A considerable amount of basic work on the first part has already been accomplished, but coordination is still lacking. An approach to the second part might be as follows:

- (1) Ascertain through interviews with leading experts outside the government what their principal objections to entering government service are.
- (2) Work out with all agencies affected a long-term publicity program designed to attract first-rate personnel.
- (3) Apprach key members of Congress with a view to obtaining

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III. Policy Planning and Research Survey

This survey, which would be undertaken primarily by the temporary PSB with outside advice solicited as needed, should attempt to answer the following questions:

- 1. What policy planning for the cold war and hot war in the field of psychological operations is currently going on?
- 2. What basic research for psychological operations in the cold war and hot war is currently going on?
- 3. What additional planning and research is needed, and what agencies should undertake it?

IV. Survey of Evaluation Activities

This survey should be undertaken along the same lines as the above.

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